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I. Introduction
While gas station underground storage tanks (“USTs”) are among the
most common polluters in this country, in many cases, often the only deep 
pocket connected with the contaminated site is the oil company (hereinafter 
the “refiner”) that supplied the hazardous product.1  But refiners rarely face 
cost recovery lawsuits because CERCLA,2 the federal statute that provides a 
private right of action, and most state statutes modeled after CERCLA, 
exclude petroleum contamination from their reach.  The states of 
Washington and Alaska have no petroleum exclusion in their CERCLA 
analogs.  However, even in these states, conventional wisdom holds that the 
refiner is only liable if it was an “owner” or an “operator” of the contaminated 
station.  It is the thesis of this paper that, under Washington’s and Alaska’s 
environmental cost recovery statutes (and any similar statute that does not 
exclude petroleum), even a non-owner/operator refiner can be held liable for 
cleanup costs, as an “arranger.”3  
1. There are four distribution pathways refiners use to get their
product to market.  In the first two, the refiner owns and operates the gas 
station as a company store, or owns the real estate and leases it to a dealer, 
who is obligated to purchase his inventory from the refiner.  In these cases, 
refiner liability under the “owner” (and, in the case of the company store, 
also the “operator”) prong of the statute is undisputed.  In the third 
distribution model, the subject of this paper, a dealer owns and operates the 
station, and the refiner sells to the dealer through an exclusive supply 
agreement.  The fourth model is distribution via jobbers, a complex fact 
pattern beyond the scope of this paper.   
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601- 9675 (2006). 
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105 et seq., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 46.03.822 (West
2012).  Some state tank fund statutes allow the tank fund to pursue cost 
recovery lawsuits under liability schemes patterned after CERCLA, and thus, 
could also employ the arranger liability theory advanced in this paper. See, 
for example, the Indiana and Iowa tank fund statutes that were the subjects 
of the cases.  Supra note 66.  While private citizens cannot use the tank fund 
statutes, of course, the availability of a cause of action against deep pocket 
refiners can ensure that the fund is solvent and able to assist in private 
cleanups. 
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Arranger liability4 is the CERCLA analog of the common law rule that a 
principal will be held vicariously liable for the torts of its independent 
contractor, when the work it engages the contractor to perform is abnormally 
dangerous.  The leading case for this proposition is U.S. v. Aceto Agr. Chemicals 
Corp.:5 
At issue in this appeal is whether the defendants “arranged for” 
the disposal of hazardous substances under the Act . . . . [The] 
defendants could be liable under common law for the abnormally 
dangerous activities of Aidex acting as an independent 
contractor, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427A (1965) . . . . [T]he 
common law [is] an appropriate source of guidance when the 
statutory language and legislative history of CERCLA prove 
inconclusive.6   
CERCLA defines “arranger” as: 
Any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
for disposal or treatment . . . of hazardous substances owned or 
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any 
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party 
or entity and containing such hazardous substances.7  
The common law elements are all present in the statutory scheme, 
with the added requirement under CERCLA, and state analogs, that the 
4. That is, arranger liability under the theory advanced in this paper
and the cases cited in support.  The plain vanilla, non-exotic application of 
arranger liability makes the generator of hazardous waste responsible for 
contamination of a facility, usually a hazardous waste dumpsite, to which 
the wastes are brought for the purpose of disposal.  See e.g., Burlington 
Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S., (2009) 556 U.S. 599, 611 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) in stating that “an arranger . . . [is an entity that] 
arrange[s] for disposal . . . of hazardous substances.”).  As with the owner 
and operator prongs of CERCLA and state analogs, arranger liability has 
been explored for application to potentially liable persons (“PLPs”) with 
more remote or complex connections to the contaminated facility, including 
fact patterns other than the one considered in this paper. 
5. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
6. Id. at 1379; see also Matter of Bell Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Sequa
Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts should look to 
the common-law principles of tort liability for guidance in interpreting the 
scope of liability in CERCLA cases).  
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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potentially liable party (“PLP”) “owned or possessed” the hazardous 
substances.  Thus, a PLP may be an arranger when it had a contractual 
relationship with the operator (“by contract, agreement or otherwise”), in 
connection with which the PLP brought hazardous substances to the 
operator’s facility (“owned or possessed”), and contamination ensued.  In 
appropriate circumstances, such a PLP can be said to have “arranged for the 
disposal,” and be held responsible for the cleanup costs.  In the arranger 
liability theory posited in this article, the circumstances giving rise to 
liability are the principal/contractor relationship between the PLP and the 
operator, and the abnormally dangerous nature of the work performed under 
that contract.   
In the refiner/dealer case, the contractual relationship is a dealership. 
The gas station operator, commonly known as a “dealer,” is engaged by the 
refiner to sell its hazardous product to the general public.  Selling gasoline 
at retail is an abnormally dangerous activity because the product can only 
be dispensed from underground tanks, and (at least in earlier generations of 
the technology), USTs all too often leak.8  
The principal is the refiner and the contractor is the dealer.  The dealer 
is liable for the cleanup costs.  The refiner shares, vicariously, the dealer’s 
liability, because of the abnormally dangerous nature of the work.  That is 
the common law version of the liability pathway.  In the language of arranger 
liability, the refiner has a contractual relationship with the dealer, in the 
course of which the refiner’s hazardous product contaminates the dealer’s 
gas station.  The refiner “arranged for the disposal” because it engaged the 
dealer to perform a contract it knew was likely to result in disposal. 
II. The Four Elements of this Arranger Liability Theory
A. PLP and Operator have a Principal/Contractor
Relationship
Not just any contractual relationship between the PLP and the 
operator will serve.  If, for example, Company A buys widgets from Company 
B, a simple buyer and seller contractual relationship is formed.  But, if 
Company A contracts with Company B to produce special widgets to A’s 
specifications, a manufacture-to-suit contract (the most common fact 
pattern in the cases discussed in this paper) is formed and a 
8. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 978 (1998) (agreeing
with trial court finding that “underground storage tanks leak despite any 
known precautions . . . . Contaminant finding its way onto the property of 
the Landowners has elements of both a trespass and a nuisance and, in 
addition, is abnormally dangerous”) (emphasis added).  
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principal/contractor relationship arises.  This is the first leg of this arranger 
liability case. 
B. The Risk of Contamination is “Inherent” in the Work
This element is the analog of the common law requirement of 
“abnormally dangerous.”  The cases use the term “inherent”9 (as in, “inherent 
in the process”) or other words of similar import.10  
C. The PLP “Owned or Possessed” the Hazardous
Substance
This element is a creature of CERCLA, not common law, but it fits the 
paradigm well.  Owner/operator liability pins responsibility on any person 
who owned or operated the facility at the time of the disposal.11  With 
arranger liability, the court looks at the person who brought the hazardous 
substances to the facility,12 and the connection that person had to the 
circumstances of the disposal.13 
9. U.S. v. Aceto Agr. Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir.
1989) (holding “[Aceto] ‘contributed to’ Aidex’s disposal of wastes . . . 
[because Aceto] contracted with Aidex to formulate their technical grade 
pesticides; they retained ownership of the pesticide throughout the process; 
and inherent in the process is the generation of wastes.”) (emphasis added); 
see also Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 781 F.Supp. 1448 
(N.D. Cal. 1991). 
10. See e.g., City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F.Supp.2d 1263, 1296
(N.D. Okla. 2003) (stating “poultry waste necessarily follows from the growing of 
poultry”) (emphasis added); U.S. v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 701 F.Supp. 140 
(W.D. Tenn. 1987) (In holding that “plaintiff’s complaint contains allegations 
that Velsicol and Terminix arranged with Arlington Blending for disposal of 
hazardous substances,” the court relied on plaintiff’s complaint that “alleges 
. . . the generation of wastes containing hazardous substances was an incident 
of the formulation and packaging processes”) (emphasis added).  
11. CERCLA imposes liability on “any person who at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any . . . facility at 
which such hazardous substances were disposed . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 
9607(a)(1).   
12. That is, the PLP had possession just before the substance came
into the operator’s possession, or had responsibility for it (as of that 
moment) by virtue of ownership —”owned or possessed.”   
13. A PLP can have multiple connections to the circumstances of the
disposal; each a separate, potential arranger cause of action.  In addition to 
the main thesis of this paper, the principal/contractor connection, and the 
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In the line of authority discussed in this article, the “owned or 
possessed” element tends to catch PLPs who are in the hazardous substance 
business and usually, though not always, to exonerate PLPs whose core 
business is other than hazardous substances.  Thus, this element serves to 
cast the liability net on Congress’ intended targets, the parties who can 
“account . . . in the pricing of their products, for the environmental 
externalities associated with improper disposal.”14 
When the PLP does not own or possess,15 the courts sometimes find 
liability on the second leg alone, the PLP’s connection to the circumstances 
of the disposal.  That is materiality/enterprise liability, the last element in 
the case. 
D. Enterprise Liability: The Contract is Material to the
PLP’s Business
The last element is materiality: the contract performed by the operator 
is material to the PLP’s business.  In a similar vein, the cases are often 
swayed by factors this author thinks of as “enterprise liability,” such as 
lopsided bargaining power or lopsided allocation of benefits in favor of the 
PLP.  This is basic tort law: strict liability reflects a determination that a 
particular person should bear a particular loss, regardless of fault, because 
the loss is properly attributed to that person’s business.16  “Thus, an 
unmistakable purpose behind CERCLA’s strict liability standard was to force 
the parties who profit from the use and generation of hazardous wastes . . . to 
account in the pricing of their products, for the environmental externalities 
arranger liability theory briefly discussed in Sections VI and VII below, a 
refiner PLP is also responsible as an arranger if it spilled product during 
delivery.  See Modern Sewer Corporation v. Nelson Distributing, 125 Wn. 
App. 564, 572, 109 P.3d 11 (2005).  Such spillage was apparently not 
uncommon in mid-twentieth century gas stations, and is thus another 
avenue to explore in bringing a case against a non-owner/operator refiner. 
See e.g., Bahrle v. Exxon Corporation, 145 N.J. 144 (1996). 
14. J.S. Lincoln v. Republic Ecology Corp., 765 F.Supp. 633, 636 (C.D.
Cal. 1991). 
15. “Owned or possessed” is not, of course, an issue in the
refiner/dealer case; the refiner always owns and possesses, and physically 
delivers, the substance to the operator’s facility.   
16. See FOWLER HARPER AND FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS,1400
(Little, Brown, 2ed. 1956), cited in Bleeda v. Hickman-Williams & Co., 44 Mich. 
App. 29, 33 (1972) ([T]he chief warrant for vicarious liability must be found in 
the principle that an enterprise (and its beneficiaries) should pay for the 
losses caused by the risks which it creates (even without its fault)”). 
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associated with improper disposal.”17  CERCLA’s policy is to shift costs “to 
the parties who benefited.”18 
Materiality is not so much an element of the case as a weighting 
factor.  Materiality is often cited to further justify a court’s decision, or, in 
close cases, to tip the liability scales one way or the other.  As one court 
summarized, “[t]he real question in all independent contractor cases is 
whether a man may ‘farm out’ or ‘lop off’ some of his affairs and escape 
liabilities in connection with them.”19  Notice, the court used the phrase 
“some of his affairs,” not “a material part of his affairs.”  But by the same 
token, the more important or profitable the contract is to the PLP, the more 
appropriate the imposition of vicarious liability.   
III. The Cases
A. Chemical Formulators
Where all the elements come together, (i) the PLP and the operator 
have a principal/contractor relationship, (ii) the work is abnormally 
dangerous (likely to pollute), and (iii) the PLP “owned or possessed” the 
hazardous substance (i.e., brought it to the facility), there is a group of cases 
that have a surprisingly common fact pattern.  In these cases, the PLP is in 
the business of manufacturing a hazardous product and engages the 
operator to carry out a discrete and waste-generating piece of the process. 
This author found eight cases in all, including and largely led by Aceto, the 
case quoted in the introduction.  All held their PLPs liable (or upheld the 
theory, remanding for more facts), seven on CERCLA arranger liability,20 one 
17. Republic Ecology Corp., supra note 14, at 635-36 (emphasis in
original).  
18. Sequa Corp., supra note 6, at 897.
19. Bleeda v. Hickman-Williams & Co., 44 Mich. App. 29, 33 (1972)
(quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.11, 1400.  To this 
author’s ear, the locution Harper and James were groping for is “fob off” 
(farm out/lop off), a phrase that captures the essence of this liability theory). 
20. Aceto, supra note 9 (pesticide formulator held liable through
arranger liability); Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 781 
F.Supp. 1448 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (pesticide formulator held liable through
arranger liability); U.S. v. Velsicol Chemical Corp, 701 F.Supp. 140
(W.D.Tenn. 1987) (chemical formulator held liable through arranger liability);
Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services, Inc., 973 F.2d 688 (9th
Cir. 1992) (chemical formulator held liable through arranger liability);
Mathews v. Dow Chemical Co., 947 F.Supp. 1517 (D. Colo. 1996) (packaging
of paint thinner and other products, held liable on arranger theory but
operator escaped liability); Morton Intern, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343
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under common law.  Three of these cases are appellate level CERCLA cases, 
including one from the Ninth Circuit, Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & 
Services, Inc.21  The common law case, Bleeda v. Hickman-Williams & Company,22 
has an excellent discussion of the policies behind principal/contractor 
vicarious liability.   
In one case without the “owned or possessed” element, but otherwise 
meeting all other requirements, there was a different result.  In Concrete Sales 
and Services, Inc. v. Blue Bird Body Co.,23 there was no liability for PLPs engaged 
in non-hazardous-substance-manufacturing businesses, who brought their 
products to the operator’s plant to be electroplated.24   
B. Industrial Poultry Farming
In a group of cases brought on non-arranger liability theories (thus, no 
need to meet the “owned or possessed” element),25 chicken magnate Tyson 
was held responsible for pollution resulting from the intensive farming 
practices of its contract poultry farmers.26   
F.3d 669 (3rd Cir. 2003) (chemical formulator held liable through arranger
liability); U.S. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 343 F.Supp.2d 809 (E.D. Mo. 2004)
(reconditioning of used drums, where contamination originated from the
chemical residues in the drums and lead paint on the outside of the drums,
held liable through arranger liability).
21. Jones-Hamilton Co., supra note 20.
22. 44 Mich. App. 29 (1972).
23. 211 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
24. Id. at 1339.
25. Tyson owned the chicks, the feed and the medicines.  The farmers
owned the waste.  The farmers used, sold or gave away the waste for use as 
fertilizer.  City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, supra note 10, at 1273. 
26. “The chicken houses have cropped up like weeds since Tyson
Foods, the world’s largest processor of pork, beef and poultry, brought its 
industrial farming system to Owensboro in the 1990 . . . . The high concen-
tration of so many animals has contaminated drinking water and fouled the 
air throughout Kentucky.” Organic Connection,  http://organicconnection.wor 
dpress.com/category/uncategorized/page/12/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) 
(quoting Krishtine De Lyon, The Dark Side of Kentucky: Tyson Chicken Houses 
(Apr. 12, 2007),  See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Stevens, 783 So.2d 804 (Ala. 2000) 
(vicarious liability for nuisance); City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods Inc., 258 
F.Supp.2d 1263 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (vicarious liability for nuisance); Sierra
Club, Inc. v. Tyson Chicken, 299 F.Supp.2d 693 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (finding Tyson
to be a “person in charge” under CERCLA and an “operator” under EPCRA).
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C. Procurement for a War Effort
The final group of cases also presents a surprisingly common fact 
pattern, eleven that this writer found, in which the U.S. government 
contracted for the production of materials needed in a war effort. The 
government was found liable in two of these cases27 and lost a motion for 
summary judgment in another.28 One case advanced the issue by denying 
both parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.29  The government 
escaped liability in the final seven cases.30   
The U.S. government, of course, is not in the hazardous substance 
business, and in most cases did not “own or possess” the chemicals that 
polluted the war contractors’ facilities.31  But in a few cases, where the 
materiality/enterprise liability factors were very strong, the courts found 
liability.   
At one end of the spectrum, in the two cases holding the government 
liable, the war was World War II and the product was a substitute for 
27. FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3rd Cir. 1994);
Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 299 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding liability on owner, operator and arranger grounds).   
28. Elf Atochem North America v. U.S., 914 F.Supp. 1166 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (denying the government’s motion for summary judgment on operator 
and arranger liability in regards to a poison gas manufacturer). 
29. Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp. 962 F.Supp. 998 (W.D.
Mich. 1995) (Korean War case denying cross motions for summary 
judgment).   
30. U.S. v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no
liability in the production of aviation fuel); State of Wash. V. U.S., 930 
F.Supp. 474 (W.D. Wa. 1996) (shipyard operator or owner found not liable;
arranger liability not argued); East Bay Mun. Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
948 F.Supp. 78 (D. D.C. 1996), aff’d 142 F.3d 479 (1998) (found no liability
where the government contracted with mining companies for their zinc
output); U.S. v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995);
Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., 280 F.Supp.2d 1094 (D. Idaho 2003); U.S.
v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995), aff’d 95 F.3d 1148
(Vietnam/Agent Orange cases, no liability); Maxus Energy Corp. v. U.S., 898
F.Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex. 1995) Vietnam/Agent Orange cases, no liability).
31. For example, in one case (FMC Corp., supra note 27, at 837), the
government assisted the operator in getting needed raw materials (including 
the polluting substances) through the War Production Board’s priority rating 
system, but did not own the materials.  From this author’s read of all but 
Cadillac Fairview, the government did not take title to any substances until 
delivery of the final product. 
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rubber.32  In 1942, almost the entire world’s supply of rubber was under 
Japanese control.33  Calling the scarcity of rubber the “greatest threat to the 
success of the Allied cause,”34 the Cadillac Fairview court reprimanded the 
government for contesting liability in the first place, stating  “[t]his is a 
shocking case.  The government is trying to take money from firms it 
conscripted for a critical part of a great war effort.”35 
At the other end of the spectrum are two Vietnam/Agent Orange cases, 
in both of which the government prevailed.36  Clearly, Vietnam was no World 
War II, and Agent Orange was no synthetic rubber.  In a particularly uncanny 
fit, the sole Korean War case saw both sides denied cross-motions for 
summary judgment, and the court musing that the case fell somewhere 
between Vertac Chem. Corp (Vietnam) and FMC (World War II).37 
The poultry producer and war-procurement cases also illustrate 
enterprise liability factors.  Tyson had vastly superior bargaining power over 
its Appalachian poultry farmers38 and the War Production Board negotiated 
the FMC contract under threat of seizure.  In the two war effort cases where 
the government was held liable, the government set the prices for the 
32. FMC Corp., supra note 27, at 836; see also Cadillac Fairview/California,
supra note 27, at 1022. 
33. Cadillac Fairview/California, supra note 27, at 1021, 22 (stating “in 1942,
the Japanese had conquered almost all of the world’s natural rubber-
producing areas in Southeast Asia”; quoting the findings of a committee 
established by President Roosevelt: “[o]f all critical and strategic materials, 
rubber is the one which presents the greatest threat to the safety of our 
nation and the success of the Allied cause”).  See also “MALAYA” (Warner Bros. 
1949), Spencer Tracy and James Stewart smuggle rubber for the war effort. 
To quote from imperfect memory the line setting up the movie’s premise, 
“An army runs on tires . . . .” 
34. Cadillac Fairview/California, supra note 27, at 1022.
35. Id. at 1029.
36. U.S. v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995), aff’d 95 F.3d
1148 (Vietnam/Agent Orange cases, no liability); Maxus Energy Corp. v. U.S., 
898 F.Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex. 1995) Vietnam/Agent Orange cases, no liability). 
37. Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp. 962 F.Supp. 998, 1005
(W.D. Mich. 1995) (Korean War case denying cross motions for summary 
judgment).  “ ‘The United States’ involvement in the present case falls 
somewhere in between its involvement in FMC and Vertac.”  
38. “ ‘These companies seek rural areas where unemployment, or
underemployment, is high and people are desperate for ways to stay on the 
farm,’ says Aloma Dew, a Sierra Club organizer in Kentucky.”  Suzi Parker, 
How Poultry Producers are Ravaging the Rural South, GRIST, http://www.grist. 
org/article/parker1/  (last visited Sept 9, 2012). 
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operator’s product and some of the raw materials39 and paid below-market 
prices for the operator’s synthetic rubber patent.40  Conversely, in many of 
the war effort cases exonerating the government, the courts noted that the 
contracts were profitable and eagerly sought by the operators.41 42 43 
IV. The Refiner as an “Arranger”
A. Principal/Contractor Relationship
Where the PLP is the manufacturer and seller of the hazardous 
substance, the “owned or possessed” element is always satisfied.  But there 
are few cases holding vendor PLPs liable as arrangers (or common-law 
principals).  This is because, in most vendor cases, the relationship between 
PLP and operator is just vendor/purchaser, not principal/contractor.  The 
operator is the consumer of the product, and, other than agreeing to pay the 
39. FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3rd Cir. 1994).
40. Cadillac Fairview/California, supra note 27, 1026.  “Dow correctly points
out that the evidence showed it shared its patents for amounts well below 
market rates, accepted a far below market management fee, and lost much 
of the benefit it might have realized when the government sold the plant to 
Shell Oil instead of Dow after the war.”  
Compare the division of spoils between Tyson and the chicken farmers:  “It’s 
a system, says the United Food and Commercial Workers, that leaves 71 
percent of growers earning below poverty-level wages.”  Parker, supra note 38.  
41. Finding the government offered premiums to mining companies to
enter into output contracts: East Bay Mun. Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 
948 F.Supp. 78, 83 (D. D.C. 1996), aff’d 142 F.3d 479 (1998) (premium price 
established for all production over quota); U.S. v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 
881 F.Supp. 1432, 1436 (E.D. Cal. 1995 (“The government also established 
the Premium Price Plan as an incentive for the production of copper and 
zinc; prices were set to encourage maximum production”); Coeur D’Alene 
Tribe v. Asarco Inc., 280 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1108 (D. Idaho 2003) (“During World 
War II, the government controlled: the price for the metals via the premium 
price plan and quota system . . .”).   
42. U.S. v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the
avgas contracts “were profitable throughout the war.” 
43. Operators actively sought the government contracts: U.S. v. Vertac
Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995), aff’d 95 F.3d 1148; Maxus Energy 
Corp. v. U.S., 898 F.Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex. 1995).  
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purchase price, nothing in the contract amounts to the operator undertaking 
to do something for the PLP’s benefit.44   
A vendor/purchaser relationship rises to the level of 
principal/contractor when the operator purchases, not for his own 
consumption, but for resale, as an exclusive dealer in the PLP’s hazardous 
product.  The operator is then essentially the PLP’s sales agent.  
This author has had the opportunity to review a few refiner/dealer 
agreements,45 and they amply demonstrate the principal/contractor nature of 
the relationship.  The dealer is not just buying a product, free to do whatever 
he wishes with it.  Rather, using Exxon’s form as an example:46  (i) the dealer 
may only resell the merchandise from one specified gas station; (ii) the 
dealer covenants to operate the station for “reasonable hours”; (iii) the 
dealer covenants to “diligently promote” the dealer’s products; and (iv) as 
typical of a true franchisor/franchisee relationship, the refiner imposes 
operating standards on the dealer, inspects for compliance, maintains 
training programs for dealers, etc.  Most significantly, the dealer commits to 
buy from the refiner exclusively,47 typically for a term of ten years or more.48   
44. E.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d
155 (7th Cir. 1988) (PLP manufactured a chemical used in the treatment of 
the operator’s lumber products). 
45. The exclusive supply agreement is, of course, the contract that
forms the basis of the refiner arranger case, as in “arranged by contract, 
agreement or otherwise.”  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (emphasis added), supra note 
7. 
46. Exxon’s supply agreement and related documents can be found
online, in pleadings posted to facilitate the administration of a class action 
lawsuit brought against Exxon by its dealers, Allapattah v. Exxon Corp, Case 
No. 91-0986-Civ-Gold (S.D. Fla).  See, EXXON DEALER CLASS ACTION WEBSITE, 
www.exxondealerclassaction.com, (last visited Sep. 9, 2012) and a related 
website, EXXON DEALER CLASS ACTION WEBSITE, http://cert.gardencitygroup. 
com/docketview/fs/admin (last visited Sep. 9, 2012).  At the latter site is a 
link entitled “Docket,” Entry 99, 71-77 of which is Exxon’s file on one of its 
dealers, Tops Petroleum, including the exclusive supply agreement.  Entitled 
simply “Sales Agreement,” it can be found at http://www.cert.gardencity 
group.com/docketview/sync/pdf/07-18-05%20(3).pdf,.   
47. Probably for anti-trust reasons, the refiner cannot require the
dealer to carry its brand exclusively, so the supply agreement typically only 
requires the dealer to carry certain minimum stocks of the refiner’s brand 
(e.g., 50%, or a certain number of pumps).  As a practical matter, once the 
dealer is ordering from the refiner, the refiner will get all or most of the 
dealer’s business.   
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48. For example, the supply agreement between Exxon and Tops
Petroleum, a dealer who owned its station, was ten years in length and, from 
an internal memorandum also posted with the Allapattah filing, it appears 
that a fifteen-year term had originally been considered.  Entitled “MK-9 
Proposal,” this memo appears in the Tops Petroleum file posted on the 
Allahpattah website.  See EXXON DEALER CLASS ACTION WEBSITE, supra note 46, AT
95. See also Testimony of Dennis C. DeCota, Executive Director of the
California Service Station and Automotive Repair Association before [US
Senate] Joint Economic Committee, Chairman: Charles Schumer regarding Is
Market Concentration in the U.S. Petroleum Industry Harming Consumers?, at 12
(May 23, 2007 ). The California Gasoline Crisis: Dealers who purchase their land
and improvements in metropolitan markets must sign long-term supply agreements for ten
to fifteen years and are forced to give the oil companies the first right of refusal if they choose
to sell, available at   http://www.jec.senate.gov/archive/hearings/05.23.07%20
Oil%20Industry%20Consolidation/Testimony%20-%20DeCota.pdf.
By comparison, when the refiner owns* the real estate and leases to a 
lessee-dealer, the refiner keeps the term of the lease and accompanying 
supply agreement short.  See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 227 (1968) 
(“These dealers typically hold a one-year lease on their stations, and these 
leases are subject to termination at the end of any year on 10 days’ notice . . 
. . The contract under which Texaco dealers receive their vital supply of 
gasoline and other petroleum products also runs from year to year and is 
terminable on 30 days’ notice under Texaco’s standard form contract.”)   
So prevalent was the practice of refiners keeping lessee-dealers on 
short-term deals, among the reforms instituted by the PMPA, refiners are 
now required to give their lessee-dealers lease terms of at least three years. 
“We used to have 90-day leases and when the PMPA law [Petroleum 
Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. sections 2801 et seq.], the federal law, 
came on board, they [were] required to offer us 3-year leases.” Minutes of 
the Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor, Sixty-ninth Session (June 
10, 1997).  This pattern, short leases for lessee-dealers, long supply 
agreements for dealers who own their stations, was also reported in CA Atty 
General Bill Lockyers’s May 2000 Report on Gasoline Pricing in California, available 
at http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-lockyer-issues-
report-gasoline-pricing-california: “According to members of the Task Force, 
approximately 70 percent of California retail stations are operated under 
station lease agreements with a major California refiner. Such dealers are 
known as ‘lessee-dealers.’ These leases are typically predicated on supply 
agreements, with a three-year term, that require the lessee dealers to 
purchase their gasoline supplies exclusively from their branded refiner. . . . A 
large portion of . . . independent dealers enter into ‘branding arrangements’ 
with a refiner or a branded jobber that allow them to sell a refiner’s 
particular brand. These contracts typically have terms of at least three years, 
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Thus, the refiner engages the dealer to operate a gas station for a term 
of ten or more years, so that the refiner will have a guaranteed outlet for the 
sale of its product.  The agency picture is completed with the refiner’s name, 
logo and trade dress prominently displayed all over the station, on the pole 
sign you can see from the freeway.  In the Leave-it-to-Beaver world of the 
mid-20th century, the dealer wore the refiner’s uniform.49  In two of the 
chemical-formulator arranger cases, the operator packaged the PLP’s 
product for sale to consumers.50  The branded gas station is the refiner’s 
consumer packaging.   
B. Materiality/Enterprise Liability
Gasoline has its challenges.  It is a consumer product, so it requires 
sales outlets in neighborhood shopping districts.  As a practical matter and 
general rule, a gas station can only carry one refiner’s brand at a time, so 
every refiner in a given market has a gas station all to itself.  And of course, 
gasoline can only be sold from facilities that are inherently dangerous to the 
and some members of the Task Force noted that branding agreements may 
have terms as long as 10 years.”  Thus, a clear pattern emerges: when the 
refiner controls the real estate, it keeps the dealer on a short leash.  When 
the dealer controls the real estate, the refiner seeks a meaningful 
relationship.  
*Using the term “ownership” here in its CERCLA sense, to include a
leasehold estate.  Delaney v. Town of Carmel, 55 F.Supp.2d 237, 258-59 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The owner of a leasehold of a CERCLA facility may be liable 
as an owner of that facility.”)  United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, 
Inc., 788 F.Supp. 1317, 1332-34 (S.D.N.Y 1992); United States v. South 
Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc. 653 F.Supp. 984, 1002-03 (D.S.C. 1984), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 
160 (4th Cir. 1988).  See Commander Oil Corp., v. Barlo Equipment Corp., 215 
F.3d 321 (2000) (2nd Cir.), for circumstances under which a lessee/sublessor
was held not to be an “owner” for CERCLA liability.  Thus, where the refiner
leases the station site from a third party, it subleases to the dealer, and all
three are likely considered “owners.”
49. You could trust your car to the man who wore the [big, red Texaco]
Star.   
50. US v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 701 F.Supp. 140, 141 (W.D. Tenn.
1987) (“[T]he plaintiff alleges that the defendants arranged for Arlington 
Blending to formulate and package pesticides containing hazardous 
substances.”) Mathews v. Dow Chemical Co., 947 F.Supp. 1517, 1519 (D. 
Colo. 1996) (“The Thoro property was used as a terminal facility for the 
packaging, storage and shipment of various cleaning solvents, antifreeze 
materials, paint thinner, and other hazardous substances”). 
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environment.  If Lex Luthor had schemed to contaminate every prime retail 
corner in the country, he could hardly have devised a more diabolical plot 
than cars, Americans, and USTs.   
However, there is no other way to sell gasoline at retail.  These 
dedicated retail outlets, gas stations,51 whether the refiner controls them 
through ownership or exclusive supply agreements,52 are critically important 
to the refiner.  Sales are a simple and direct function of the number and 
quality of branded stations the refiner controls.53   
51. Exxon calls them “secure and ratable outlet[s]” in its 2007 annual
report (supra note 53) and “retail stores” in its internal memoranda.  See 
EXXON DEALER CLASS ACTION WEBSITE, supra note 46.  That is, “retail stores” as 
in “Retail Store No. 4-0135.”  Like all companies in the retail business, Exxon 
keeps track of its “retail stores” with a numeric tracking system.  It is clear 
from the Allapattah documents that this tracking system makes no distinction 
between stores that Exxon owns and leases to lessee-dealers, and dealer-
owned stores that Exxon controls through exclusive supply agreements. 
While it could not be discerned one way or the other from the Allapattah 
filings, it seems logical that Exxon maintains the same numeric tracking 
system for its company-owned and –operated stores as well. 
52. A case can also be made for treating the exclusive supply
agreement as an ownership interest in the dealer’s facility.  It is, for all 
intents and purposes, a restrictive covenant that binds that property to serve 
as an exclusive outlet for the sale of the refiner’s product.  Certainly, the 
refiner achieves the same benefit through the supply agreement that it gets 
from owning the stations that are operated as company stores, or leased out 
to lessee-dealers with exclusive supply agreements, namely, dedicated 
outlets for its product.  This is a particularly viable argument under 
Washington’s definition of “owner,” a person having “any ownership interest” 
in the facility.  RCW 70.105D.020(17)(a) (Emphasis added).  In one supply 
agreement that this author had the opportunity to review, where the dealer 
owned the real estate (had fee title), the refiner required the dealer to give it 
a right of first refusal if the dealer chose to sell the property.  A good 
argument can be made that a right of first refusal is also an ownership 
interest.   
53. ExxonMobil, for example, boasts of the “secure and ratable
outlets,” 32,000 branded gas stations as of its 2007 Annual Report, that 
allow it to “capture the highest value for our refined molecules.” EXXON
MOBILE CORPORATION, 2007 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 30,  available at 
http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/news_pub_sar_2007.pdf: 
Fuels Marketing provides a secure and ratable outlet for our refineries . . 
. We continue to leverage integration with our refining business across our 
four Fuels Marketing business lines.  Downstream cross-functional teams 
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Thus, the refiner/dealer case has materiality.  As for the other factors 
that tip the liability scales, such as lopsided bargaining power and 
allocation of benefits, Peak Oil and other circumstances have led to record 
profits in the oil industry.54  But it doesn’t take an expert witness to figure 
out, as between the refiner and the dealer, which party has reaped the 
benefits.  The refiner sets the wholesale price the dealer pays, daily, in the 
refiner’s sole discretion.  For one piece of anecdotal evidence55 that caught 
this author’s eye: 
Every time Sohalia Rezazadah rings up a sale at her Exxon 
station in the Oakton section of Fairfax, VA, her cash register 
sends the information to Exxon Mobil’s central computers.  If she 
raises the price of gasoline a couple of pennies, chances are that 
Exxon will raise the wholesale price she pays by the same 
amountFalseJerry Daggle owns five Exxon stations in Northern 
Virginia, and even though they have different competitive 
conditions and prices, “Exxon magically lets me make about 8 
cents a gallon” at each one, he said.56  
focus on optimizing product placement across the broad spectrum of 
customer segments to capture the highest value for our refined molecules. 
54. Businessinsider.com, Oil Company Profits to Blow by Last Year and It’s
not Just Because of Soaring Crude Prices, http://www.businessinsider.com/oil-
profits-exxon-22011-4 and Oil Profits Likely to Impress, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Apr. 24, 2011), available at  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748 
704071704576277523933629728.html.  
55. Steve Mufson, Peeved at Prices? Don’t Blame the Dealer, WASH. POST
(May 25, 2008), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2008/05/24/AR2008052401961.html.   
56. Id.; Possibly, due to industry consolidation and other factors,
refiners have more power over their dealers today than ever.  However, the 
practice of treating dealers as little more than commissioned sales agents 
goes way back.  In earlier service station days, products such as tires, 
batteries, and automotive accessories (“TBA”) were often carried as a 
secondary line of merchandise and services at service stations.  In the 1940s, 
some of the oil companies got together with tire manufacturers to work out 
a mutually beneficial deal.  The oil company got a 10% commission on all 
TBA sold at the refiner’s branded stations, and the tire manufacturer got its 
sales boosted.  And while the oil companies insisted that their dealers were 
free to carry any brand of TBA they chose, TBA deals earned oil companies 
several million in commissions before the FTC put the kibosh on it, in the 
early 60s.  See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968), supra note 48; 
Atlantic Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Shell Oil Co. v. F.T.C, 360 
F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966).
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This is an appropriate point to mention the elephant in the room, that 
this is the most profitable industry in the history of the world, whose 
product has left a trail of waste in its path.  And yet, due to CERCLA’s 
petroleum exclusion, the oil companies have largely escaped liability.  At 
least in the States of Washington and Alaska, that does not have to be the 
case. 
C. Inherent Risk/Abnormally Dangerous Activity
This article will not spend too much time discussing whether the 
inherent risk/abnormally dangerous element can be proven.  For the time 
period in which the worst UST leaks occurred, pre-LUST,57 it should be easy 
to demonstrate that USTs leaked more often than not, and the oil industry 
was well aware of the fact.  In fact, there is one case holding that operating a 
gas station UST in the 1960s – 80s was indeed an abnormally dangerous 
activity, because of USTs’ propensity to leak, for the purpose of making a 
refiner share vicariously the liability of the independent commissioned 
driver it engaged to make deliveries.58   
D. The Counter-Arguments
The more traditional defenses to exotic arranger liability theories are 
considered at length below.  This section addresses an anticipated argument 
distinguishing the Aceto line of cases (the chemical formulators) from the 
refiner/dealer case.  There is one fact in the Aceto line of cases not shared by 
the refiner/dealer case.  In Aceto, the PLP retained ownership of the 
hazardous substance after delivery to the operator’s facility.59  Thus, the PLP 
owned the substance when it suffered its unfortunate disposal.60  In the 
57. LUSTs (“Leaking Underground Storage Tanks”) are state programs
that set standards for underground storage tank construction and leak 
detection, enacted pursuant to the federal Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976) (amended 1978).   
58. Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 NE.2d 962, 978 (Ind. 1998) (filling the
USTs was held to be a “daily operation of the facility” within the meaning of 
that state’s tank fund statute, so the driver was liable as an operator, and the 
refiner was vicariously liable).   
59. “Plaintiffs allege defendants owned the technical grade pesticide
alleged to be a “hazardous substance” under CERCLA, the work in process 
and the resulting chemical grade product; that is, the defendant retained 
ownership of its pesticide throughout the formulation and packaging 
process.”  Aceto, supra note 9, at 1378.   
60. Aceto, supra note 9, at 1373.
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refiner/dealer case, title to the hazardous product passes to the dealer when 
delivery is made.  But this is a weak distinction at best. 
First, we are interpreting a statute in which “owned or possessed 
hazardous substances” is a specific element of the liability case. 61 Under the 
statute, the PLP does not have to have ever owned the substances, let alone, 
be the owner at the time of the disposal.   
It is also clear that the “owned or possessed” element applies at the 
moment the substance is delivered by the PLP to the facility, not at the time 
of disposal.  This is especially clear in the Washington statute’s definition of 
“arranger,”  “any person who owned or possessed a hazardous substance and 
who . . . arranged for disposal of the hazardous substance at the facility . . . .” 
62  There is an understood, elided “then” or “thereafter” in that locution: “any 
person who owned a substance and [then] arranged for disposal . . . .”63 
Furthermore, logically, “owned or possessed” cannot mean as of the time of 
disposal, because the PLP cannot possibly be in possession then, the 
substance is physically at the operator’s facility. 
While the Aceto line of cases often attaches importance to the fact that 
the PLP owned the hazardous substance, this does not make ownership an 
element of the liability case. It is not an element of the common law 
principle/contractor case; vicarious liability is not limited to cases where the 
contractor works on something the principle owns. 64  Rather, ownership is 
only one piece of evidence that may be advanced to prove the materiality of 
the contract to the PLP’s business.  Materiality can be demonstrated in 
many different ways.65   
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (emphasis added), supra note 7.
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(c) (West 2012). See infra Section VIII
(Washington’s statutory language, and the case law thereunder, are 
discussed more fully). 
63. Id.
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 55.
65. Facts demonstrating materiality in these cases (in addition to
ownership of the product) are typical of a manufacture-to-suit contract, e.g., 
the principal provides detailed specifications for the work and inspects for 
quality.  In FMC Corp. v. United States, 786 F.Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992), the 
government actively assisted the contractor in many ways, including 
procurement of scarce materials and labor, to the extent of mediating labor 
disputes at the plant and setting up another operator to supply a needed 
raw material. That the principal owned the substance on which the operator 
performed its work is simply in the nature of the contract the operator was 
engaged to perform.   
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V. Reported Refiner/Dealer Cases
As CERCLA and most state analogs exclude petroleum contamination,
there are only a handful of reported cases considering statutory refiner 
liability for contaminated gas stations.  There are a handful of tank fund 
cases that, despite vigorous prosecution, only argued “owner/operator” 
liability and did not present an arranger liability theory.66  However, there are 
two cases, decided under common law theories, which are right on point.   
The first of these cases67 held that one refiner defendant did not have 
sufficient control over the dealer to merit vicarious liability for trespass. 
However, a second refiner defendant, which, for a period of time, supplied 
the dealer on a consignment basis, was held liable.68  What is significant is, 
the court apparently thought the consignment dealer’s liability was so self-
evident, it did not even merit a discussion.69  Consignment is, of course, the 
dealer acting very literally as the refiner’s sales agent.70  The court simply 
failed to see that the same thing is going on in the more standard 
refiner/dealer relationship, the dealer is essentially the refiner’s sales agent. 
Certainly, the consignment refiner exercised no more control over the 
dealer, in any relevant respect, than did the refiner defendant who had a 
more traditional supply relationship with its dealer. 
In the second case, the plaintiffs in Bahrle v. Exxon Corp. argued that 
refiner defendants should be held vicariously liable as principals 
responsible for an abnormally dangerous activity carried out by an 
independent contractor.71  This is the exact theory posited here.  One 
defendant, Texaco, which had supplied the contaminated station through a 
66. See Meyer, supra note 8; Shell Oil Co. v. Lovold Co., 705 N.E.2d 981
(Ind. 1999); Kaghann’s Korner, Inc. v. Brown & Sons Fuel Co., Inc., 706 N.E.2d 
556 (Ind. 1999); Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank 
Fund Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Iowa 2000).  
67. JBT/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. P’ship v. Wheeler, 346 Md. 601 (Md.
1996).  
68. Id. at 627.
69. Id.
70. “Consignment” is defined as: “Trading arrangement in which a
seller sends goods to a buyer or reseller who pays the seller only as and 
when the goods are sold.  The seller remains the owner (title holder) of the 
goods until they are paid for . . . .”  BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www. 
businessdictionary.com/definition/consignment-sale.html (last visited Oct. 
22, 2012). 
71. 145 N.J. 144 (1996).
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jobber, was held not liable.72  The court’s decision to let Texaco off the hook 
provides a tantalizing negative pregnant for our case:  
Plaintiffs’ claim against Texaco fails for the basic reason that they 
have failed to prove that Texaco hired Rule [the dealer] as an 
independent contractor.  Except for the three- to six-month 
period during the early 1970s when Texaco supplied Rule with 
gasoline, Rule had no direct relationship with Texaco.  Rule dealt 
exclusively with Kalsch-Forte [the jobber].  A contractual 
relationship existed between Rule and Kalsch-Forte, not between 
Rule and Texaco.73  
That is, no vicarious liability because no direct principal/contractor 
relationship in a jobber-supplied station.74  Meanwhile, defendant Exxon, 
which did have a direct supply contract with the Bahrle dealer, settled out of 
the case early.75  
There are few reported CERCLA cases analogous to the refiner/dealer 
case, because there are few consumer products that are both hazardous and 
dispensed from leaky facilities, such that the dealer’s store gets 
contaminated.  The closest this author knows of are two cases considering a 
refiner’s liability for the disposal of used motor oil collected by dealers 
performing oil change services.  In General Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, 
Inc.,76 the court found the refiner not liable as an arranger, noting that the 
72. Id. at 155.
73. Id.
74. The jobber-supplied station is a complex case that is outside the
purview of this paper.  However, there may be a pathway to arranger liability 
that is much stronger than the common law case.  The arranger liability 
theory discussed briefly below in Sections VI and VII, breach of the refiner’s 
affirmative duty of care, may serve to bring into the liability net even refiners 
employing this most insulated distribution model. 
More and more, oil companies choose the jobber distribution model, in 
order to afford themselves all the benefits of controlling retail outlets, while 
avoiding the responsibility that comes with ownership. The court in Meyer 
acknowledged that refiners use jobbers specifically to avoid liability.  Supra 
note 8, at 978.  However, far from being shocked, the court congratulated the 
oil industry on the success of the maneuver.  Id.  “In the 1960s Shell and 
many other major oil companies apparently sought to limit their exposure 
to liability by introduction of the jobber into the distribution chain . . . . [W]e 
conclude that this effort was largely successful.”  Id. 
75. Bahrle, supra note 71, at 148.
76. 962 F.2d 281 (2nd Cir. 1992).
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refiner did not require the dealer to offer oil change services to the public. 
That fits the paradigm: If the refiner does not require its dealer to do oil 
changes, then there is no principal/contractor relationship with respect to 
the refiner’s motor oil product.  In the case of United States v. Arrowhead 
Refining Co.,77 the court said that there would be no liability even if the refiner 
did so require its dealers to do oil changes, because the oil change business 
provided more benefit to the dealer than to the refiner: 78  And there you 
have materiality/enterprise liability factors resulting in a defense verdict.79 
VI. Control is Not an Element of the Arranger Case
A continuing source of frustration for this author is the Environmental
Bar’s determination to make all remote PLP cases about exercising control 
over the operator.80  It is apparently inconceivable to practitioners in this 
field that remote liability can be based on anything other than exercising 
control, and they believe this makes for good policy. 
To any defendant insisting that no remote arranger case can be made, 
absent the exercise of control over the operator, there are two ready 
responses.  First, the “operator” prong of the cost recovery scheme already 
captures remote PLPs that exercise control.81  Under basic rules of 
construction, if a statute covers one concept with a particular term and 
definition (operator liability), and then introduces a second concept with a 
different term and definition (arranger), two different things are intended.82  
Second, Aceto and its progeny comprise a significant body of case law 
imposing arranger liability for reasons other than exercise of control.83   
77. 829 F.Supp. 1078 (D. Minn. 1992).
78. Id. at 1093.
79. Id. at 1094.
80. By “remote PLP,” this author means a PLP who does not occupy
one of the automatic liability roles, like direct ownership or operation, but 
rather has some connection to the owner, operator, or facility. 
81. This is expressly incorporated into Washington’s definition of
operator as “any person . . . who exercises any control over the facility.” 
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.020(17)(a) (West 2012). 
82. “Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected
by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates 
otherwise.”  Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). 
83. Aceto, supra note 9.
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But because this axiom has become so ingrained in the conventional 
wisdom, and because broad statements can be quoted from too many 
loosely written opinions,84 a more developed response is merited. 
A. Control as a Governing Liability Principle is Bad Policy
Control as a governing liability principle in remote PLP environmental 
cases is sadly pervasive.  Thus, for example, in the case of Moses Lake, a 
federal court interpreting Washington’s cost recovery statute, the court 
makes blanket statements such as this one (purporting to show the 
difference between operator liability and arranger liability): 
The well-settled rule is that ‘operator’ liability only attaches if the 
defendant had authority to control the cause of the contamination . . . . With 
regard to ‘arranger’ liability, the relevant question is ‘control’ over ‘disposal’ 
arising from something other than the ‘operation’ of a facility, for example, 
by way of some contractual relationship or transaction.85   
Even Aceto loses its footing here, dismissing a defendant’s control 
argument based on a previous arranger case decided by that court, by 
asserting that the Aceto PLP’s ability to control the operator could be 
“inferred” from its ownership of the product the operator was working on. 86  
Such pronouncements do real harm.  With overbroad language like 
that quoted from Moses Lake and Aceto informing the conventional wisdom, 
environmental lawyers typically advise their clients to have nothing to do 
with another company’s environmental compliance practices, because the 
client could end up with liability if things go wrong; whether or not its input 
was helpful or hurtful, whether or not the harm could have been prevented 
in the first place.87  “[A]voidance of this liability is precisely the reason that 
major oil producers today check everything at a station except the 
USTs . . . .”88  When case law and commentary lead parties with UST expertise 
to go out of their way not to assist their less sophisticated dealers, as an 
84. See, e.g., Burlington Northern, supra note 4 (language quoted at note
111 below). 
85. City of Moses Lake v. U.S., 458 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1225-29 (E.D. Wash.
2006). Among other criticisms one might level at this statement, the court 
distinguishes operator control from arranger “control” by putting quotation 
quotes around the word in one usage but not the other, and quote marks 
around arranger “disposal” but not operator disposal.  Distinguishing one 
descriptor from the other with nothing other than punctuation is, this 
author suggests, not persuasive argument. 
86. Aceto, supra note 9, at 1382.
87. Lovold Co., supra note 66, at 980.
88. Id.
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industry-wide phenomenon, this hardly furthers the goal of protecting the 
environment.   
Such has been the unfortunate result of the Environmental Bar’s 
obsession with control, its determination to make control the sine qua non of 
all remote PLP cases.  Persons who might otherwise influence the 
environmental practices of others for the better have been advised to keep 
hands well off.89   
The challenge to crafting a workable liability rule is that environmental 
harm is sometimes preventable and sometimes not.  Legislatures and courts 
want to craft the law so as to encourage prevention as much as possible, 
while still imposing responsibility on a strict liability basis where merited.  It 
can be done.  The common law has this all figured out.   
B. Control as a Governing Liability Principle is Bad Law
Let’s start with the statutory framework.  Under arranger liability, a 
person who “owned or possessed” a hazardous substance (for short, we’ll 
refer to him as an “owner/possessor”) cannot just hand off possession or 
title to a third person, the operator, and be free of further responsibility for 
the substance.  If the arrangement between owner/possessor PLP and 
operator is for the express purpose of disposing of the substance, the PLP is 
strictly liable for any mishap that subsequently occurs, even if disposal at 
the operator’s facility was legal and entirely responsible.  That’s the basic 
iteration of arranger liability, an arrangement for the express purpose of 
disposal.90   
The tougher calls are when an inadvertent disposal occurs at the 
operator’s facility.  This is where the common law comes in handy. 
This article looks at one liability pathway based on common law, 
principal/contractor liability for an abnormally dangerous activity.  There is 
no question that control is not an element of this liability case under the 
common law: while the general rule does predicate liability on the 
principal’s control over the contractor,91 abnormally dangerous activity is 
89. In-house with a large financial institution in the late-80s, this
author witnessed firsthand this conventional wisdom take hold in the real 
estate lending bar.  Sharman Braff, The Lender as Environmental Policeman: 
Comment on EPA’s Draft Lender liability Rules, 5 TOXICS L. REP. at 1429 (Apr. 10, 
1991)].   
90. In the next section, we will rebut the argument that express intent
to dispose is the only proper basis for arranger liability. 
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 55 and 56. “An actor who hires
an independent contractor for an activity creating a risk of physical harm is 
subject to liability for physical harm when the actor’s negligence is a factual 
cause of any such harm within the scope of liability, subject to the duty 
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one of many well-established exceptions.92  It is also well-established that 
this is a strict liability case, responsibility lies without regard to fault on the 
part of principal or contractor, due to the abnormally dangerous nature of 
the activity: the harm is likely to occur despite all due precautions. 
Application of common law tort principles also serves to bring reason 
and sense to other inadvertent-disposal arranger cases.93  In this author’s 
very limited review of such arranger cases, the common law principles often 
align with the court’s decision and reasoning, if not always its express 
language.  These cases often come down to the most basic tort principle of 
all: Did the defendant, under the circumstances of that case, owe a duty of 
care? 
Through this common law tort prism, for example, the case of Moses 
Lake, with its otherwise confounding language, makes sense.  We dismiss the 
court’s unhelpful control-premised liability rule, quoted above.  Moses Lake 
later goes on to say that the relevant inquiry is whether the PLP “reasonably 
could have done something to prevent the resulting contamination, or to 
have corrected the same as soon as possible.”94  Basic, tort law duty of care. 
And indeed, the Moses Lake ruling turns on whether the PLP was at fault in 
the design of the equipment and system that allowed hazardous substances 
to be released into the environment.95 
limitation in Section 56.  Id. at § 55.  “As to work entrusted to an 
independent contractor, the actor owes a duty of care only with respect to 
any part of the work over which the actor has retained control.”  Id. at § 56.  
92. “An actor [principal] who hires an independent contractor to do
work that the actor knows or should know involves an abnormally dangerous 
activity is subject to vicarious liability for physical harm when the activity is 
the factual cause of any such harm within the scope of liability.”  Id. at § 59. 
93. While somewhat off-topic for this article, a short digression, is
helpful to further inoculate our refiner/dealer plaintiff from this anticipated 
counter-argument.   
94. Moses Lake, supra note 85, at 1234.
95. The court found a question of fact as to the PLP’s culpability,
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.  See e.g., Moses Lake, 
supra note 85, at 1234: “While Lockheed designed the layout of the 
equipment in the MAMS facility and installed the equipment, there is no 
conclusive, undisputed evidence establishing that release of TCE waste into 
the ground was inherent in the operation of the equipment at the MAMS 
facility. There is no conclusive, undisputed evidence that Lockheed knew 
there was some kind of defect in the plumbing in the MAMS facility which 
would allow TCE waste to end up in the ground; that it knew the plumbing 
led to unlined ditches and pits that leached to the ground; or that it knew of 
or had the power to “control” TCE waste being poured down drains, showers 
and eye wash stations, ultimately being discharged to the ground, as 
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In similar fashion, inadvertent-disposal arranger cases such as 
NEPACCO,96 Berg,97 and Modern Sewer98 can best be reconciled with logic and 
good policy by characterizing them as cases that turn on, not whether the 
PLP exercised or had the ability to exercise control over the operator, but 
whether the PLP had an affirmative duty of care in the circumstances of that 
case, and properly discharged the duty.99  
As a final gloss on this side trip into non-principal/contractor arranger 
cases, it is also well to note that many inadvertent disposal cases entertain, 
and sometimes result in liability verdicts against, non-owner/possessor PLP 
defendants.  This is a particularly broad interpretation of arranger liability, 
dispensing with the statutory element of “owned or possessed.”  (As noted 
in the discussion of the state statutes in Section VIII below, Washington’s 
statutory language expressly invites this broader casting of the arranger 
liability net.)  For purposes of the mission of this article, making the case for 
refiner/dealer liability (in which “owned or possessed” is not an issue, this 
element is indisputably satisfied), this observation is one more distinction 
to ward off refiner defendants who might throw out control-riddled case 
language in their defense.  As Aceto notes in dismissing its own defendant’s 
attempt at such an argument, its previous ruling in the NEPACCO case 
applied arranger liability to “those who had the authority to control the 
disposal, even without ownership or possession.”100   
The next section discusses at length the recent Supreme Court case of 
Burlington Northern.  The purpose of that discussion is to rebut the argument 
that arranger liability can never apply to an inadvertent disposal.  Among 
opposed to some holding tank. There is no conclusive, undisputed evidence 
that Lockheed designed the plumbing system.”   
96. Continental Insurance Companies v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chemical Company, Inc., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (sometimes referred 
to as “NEPACCO”). 
97. Berg v. Popham, 113 P.3d 604 (Alaska 2005)
98. Modern Sewer Corp. v. Nelson Distrib., Inc., 125 Wash. App. 564
(2005).  In Modern Sewer, the PLP inadvertently pumped fuel into the 
groundwater, mistaking a monitoring well for a UST fill pipe. 
99. See, e.g., this explanation of the NEPACCO case in U.S. v. Shell:
“However, we believe that the Oil Companies’ conception of “authority to 
control” is based on an incorrect reading of NEPACCO.  In NEPACCO, there 
was actual control exercised by vice-president Lee, who gave permission to 
the plant supervisor to dispose of the waste at the farm . . . . Moreover, an 
analogy to NEPACCO misses the essence of that case: The court in 
NEPACCO held officers of a bankrupt company liable for an actual misdeed 
of that corporation.”  U.S. v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 30, at 1057. 
100. Aceto, supra note 9, at 1382 (emphasis added).
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other things, the analysis of Burlington Northern will draw on the thesis 
posited in this section.  In this author’s opinion, the Burlington Northern case 
is a prime example of a court applying common law tort principles to decide 
an inadvertent arranger liability case, even though such principles are never 
expressly named or acknowledged in the opinion. 
VII. Didn’t Burlington Northern Kill Exotic Arranger Liability
Theories? (The “Useful Product/Intent to Dispose”
Defense)
The argument against creative applications of arranger liability usually 
centers on the related concepts of “useful product” and “intent to dispose.” 
Under this interpretation, a PLP can only be an arranger with respect to a 
contaminated facility if it brought hazardous substances to the facility 
specifically in order to dispose of them.101  The argument is sometimes 
articulated as “there can be no disposal liability when the substance brought 
by the PLP to the facility was not hazardous waste when delivered, but rather 
a ‘useful product.’ “102   
In an 8 to 1 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in Burlington Northern 
overturned a Ninth Circuit decision imposing arranger liability on a chemical 
manufacturer for its customer’s contaminated facility.103  The PLP 
manufactured and sold pesticides to an operator in the business of aerial 
spraying for farm clients.104  Among other things, the chemicals were stored 
in large tanks that leaked.105  Despite the happy result for the defendant, 
Burlington Northern did not establish “useful product/intent to dispose” as an 
absolute defense to arranger liability.106  To the contrary, the Supreme Court 
carefully limited its ruling to the facts of the case before it, explaining that 
“the determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-specific 
inquiry that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a 
‘disposal’ or a ‘sale,’ and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was one 
101. The argument is, the word “arrange” connotes intentionality—
”intent to dispose”—in its common dictionary definition.  This author finds 
the counter-argument more persuasive, that the term “disposal” is defined 
in the statute to include unintentional releases. See discussion in Burlington 
Northern, supra note 4, at 612. 
102. Burlington Northern, supra note 4, at 610-612; see also discussion of
Seattle City Light and Modern Sewer in Section VIII, below.  
103. Burlington Northern, supra note 4, at 599.
104. Id. at 602-04.
105. Id. at 604.
106. Id. at 612.
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Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s strict liability 
provisions.”107  
The Court’s “fact-specific inquiry” revealed that the Burlington Northern 
spills were largely the operator’s fault, due to “sloppy” housekeeping, and 
that Shell, the PLP defendant, had made substantial efforts to help its 
customer handle the product responsibly.108  The facts cited as “not 
supporting liability” were:  
[T]hat Shell took numerous steps to help its distributors reduce
the likelihood of such spills, providing them with detailed safety
manuals, requiring them to maintain adequate storage facilities,
and providing discounts for those who took safety
precautions . . . . Although Shell’s efforts were less than 
successful, given these facts, Shell’s mere knowledge that spills and 
leaks continued to occur is insufficient grounds for concluding 
that Shell “arranged for” the disposal . . . .109  
Thus, the Burlington Northern PLP avoided arranger liability because it 
took affirmative steps to help the operator prevent spills.  Not because the 
hazardous substance was a useful product when delivered, and not because 
arranger liability can never apply to anything but a literally intentional 
disposal.  Had it been the Court’s intention to adopt “useful product/intent 
to dispose” as an absolute defense, Burlington Northern would have been the 
perfect opportunity to so rule.  That the Court did not take this step is 
especially apparent in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.  If the majority had just 
made “useful product/intent to dispose” the law of the land, a dissenting 
opinion would have laid out the arguments against such a rule.  Justice 
Ginsburg mentions no such disagreement with the majority.110  Rather, she 
based her dissent on very specific facts; facts that tended to show culpability 
on the PLP’s part (the PLP required the operator to take delivery of, and thus 
store, the product in large tanks that leaked),111 just as the majority opinion 
highlighted facts that showed the PLP acting responsibly.  (“As the facts found 
by the District Court bear out . . . Shell “arranged for disposal . . . .”)112 
107. Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 604.
109. Id. at 612-13 (second emphasis added).
110. Id. (Ginsburg, R., dissenting).
111. Exxon’s form supply agreement also requires the dealer to
maintain underground storage tanks.  Not that there is, in the case of a gas 
station, any alternative.  Id. at 621 (Ginsburg, R., dissenting). 
112. Id. at 1884-85 (Ginsburg, R., dissenting).  As in the cases and
conventional wisdom discussed in the preceding Section VI, Justice 
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In other words, under both the majority and dissenting opinions, in 
order avoid arranger liability, to be considered to not have “intended” a 
disposal to occur, the PLP may have an affirmative duty of care to discharge. 
In Burlington Northern, both majority and dissent implicitly found that Shell 
did have a duty of care, they just disagreed about whether Shell discharged 
it.113   
Burlington Northern did not overrule Aceto or its progeny.  Aceto is 
nowhere mentioned in the Supreme Court decision.114  The hazardous 
substances at issue in the Aceto cases were very much useful products when 
delivered to those operators, and waste disposal was not the reason those 
PLPs brought the substances to the operators’ facilities.115  Aceto, therefore, 
remains good law. 
Finally, even if Burlington Northern could be interpreted to disallow 
arranger liability in any case but intentional disposal, a court interpreting 
state law is not bound by a CERCLA decision.  The state court is interpreting 
a different statute, under a different jurisprudential hierarchy, and CERCLA 
cases interpreting the parallel federal law, while persuasive, are not 
controlling.  Indeed, both Alaska’s and Washington’s statutes have been 
both written and interpreted more liberally than CERCLA on arranger 
Ginsburg’s opinion unfortunately perpetuates the “ability to control” meme: 
In her opinion, the lowers courts appropriately found Shell liable “given the 
control rein held by Shell over the mode of delivery and transfer . . . .”  Id.  It 
is well to note that it was not Shell’s control over the mode of delivery and 
transfer, but the fact that the delivery mode Shell required (bulk storage), in 
preference to other, less convenient alternatives, caused the harm: “Because 
D-D is corrosive, bulk storage of the chemical led to numerous tank failures
and spills as the chemical rusted tanks and eroded valves.”   Id. at 1886.
That is, it was not control per se, but the misuse of it, the defendant’s failure
of its duty of care, that led Justice Ginsburg to vote to hold this PLP liable.
113. Id. Indeed therefore, far from ending exotic arranger liability,
Burlington Northern implicitly holds that the vendor of a hazardous substance 
may have an affirmative duty to help its vendee handle the product 
responsibly, and breach of this duty will make the vendor liable as an 
arranger.  This is another avenue to explore in the case against the refiner.  If 
it is indeed true that the oil industry has taken a hands-off approach to its 
dealers’ tanks and compliance practices, that conventional wisdom could 
backfire.  See Lovold Co., supra note 66.   
114. Id.
115. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989)
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liability, and Washington courts have already rejected “intent to dispose” as 
a defense.116   
VIII. Arranger Liability Under Washington and Alaska
Statutes
Both in their statutory language and in case law, Alaska and 
Washington give arranger liability a liberal interpretation. 
A. Washington
Washington’s CERCLA analog, the Model Toxics Control Act (“MTCA”) 
provides the following variation on the concept of “arranger”: 
Any person who owned or possessed a hazardous substance and 
who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal 
of treatment of the hazardous substance, or arranged with a 
transporter for transport for disposal of the hazardous 
substances at the facility, or otherwise generated hazardous 
wastes disposed of or treated at the facility.117  
1. Intent to Dispose
In City of Seattle (Seattle City Light) v. Washington State Dep’t of 
Transportation,118 the court quoted our lead case, Aceto, and found that 
arranger liability does not require intent to dispose: “[I]t is possible to 
‘arrange’ for disposal even while hoping that it ends up in the best of all 
possible spots, or while insisting that proper practices be rigorously 
followed.”119   
A second case, Modern Sewer Corporation v. Nelson Distributing, is directly 
on point, explaining that “[t]he term ‘disposal’ as used in MTCA’s “arranger” 
liability provision encompasses intentional as well as unintentional 
disposal.”120  Requiring proof of intent “would discourage companies from 
116. See, e.g., City of Seattle (Seattle City Light) v. Washington State
Dep’t of Transp., 98 Wash. App. 165, 173 (1999); Modern Sewer Corp. v. 
Nelson Distrib., Inc., 125 Wash. App. 564 (2005). 
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(c) (West 2012).
118. 98 Wash. App. 165 (1999).
119. 989 P.2d at 1169.
120. 109 P.3d 11 (2005), at 14 (quoting City of Seattle, supra note 116, at
171.) 
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carefully tracking their hazardous substances, contrary to the intent and 
purpose of the MTCA.”121   
2. Arranger Liability is More Liberal Under MTCA than
Under CERCLA
By design and interpretation, MTCA is more liberal than CERCLA. 
MTCA’s stated policy is to safeguard the healthy environment it deems a 
“fundamental and inalienable right [that] each person has a responsibility to 
preserve and enhance . . . .”122  This is a “solemn obligation of the present 
generation for the benefit of future generations.”123  MTCA’s more liberal 
approach is particularly evident in arranger liability, the statutory definition 
of which goes further than CERCLA’s, with the addition of this phrase to its 
definition: “. . . or otherwise generated hazardous wastes disposed of or 
treated at the facility.”124  This added language denotes that the liability net 
is to be broadly cast; among other things, it allows for arranger liability 
against PLPs who did not “own or possess.”125  The “or otherwise generated” 
language is also further proof that MTCA arranger liability has no 
intentionality requirement, since there is no connotation of “intent to 
dispose” in the concept “or otherwise generated wastes.”   
B. Alaska
Alaska’s statute uses CERCLA’s definition of “arranger” almost 
verbatim: 
Any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
for disposal . . . of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
the person, at any facility . . .  owned or operated by another 
party or entity and containing hazardous substances, from which 
there is a release, or a threatened release that causes the 
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance.126 
121. Id.
122. WASH. REV. CODE, supra note 117.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.  See discussion in Section VI.
126. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (West 2012).  The variation is the
addition of the word “or” before a phrase elided in the language quoted in 
this paper.  In CERCLA, the phrase reads “hazardous substances owned or 
possessed by the person, by any other party or entity, at any facility . . . .”  42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) In the Alaska statute, the phrase is:  “hazardous 
substances owned or possessed by the person, or by any other party or 
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The court in Berg v. Popham127 held that Alaska’s statute intends a more 
liberal reach for arranger liability than CERCLA.  It held the manufacturer of 
dry cleaning equipment liable as an arranger for the contamination caused 
by a retail dry cleaning plant discharging wastes into the sewer system 
(because the manufacturer designed the system to discharge waste solvent 
directly into the sanitary sewer system)—a fairly aggressive decision.128  And 
while in another case, an Alaska court refused to hold a jobber responsible 
for a gas station cleanup, finding strong legislative intent to not draw fuel 
“distributors” into the liability net, refiners (as demonstrated above) have a 
much stronger connection to a branded gas station than a distributor does 
to the independent stations it serves.129   
C. State Law Summarized
Thus, in both statutory language and reported decisions, Washington 
and Alaska have shown a willingness to give arranger liability a broad 
interpretation.  Washington cases have rejected the “intent to dispose” 
defense, and quoted our lead case, Aceto, with approval.  Coupled with these 
states’ decision to reject CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion in the first place, it 
would seem that the refiner/dealer liability theory posited in this article 
would find a receptive audience in their courts. 
IX. Conclusion
There is a small but solid body of authority, drawn from black letter
common law, with facts closely analogous to the refiner/dealer case.  The 
CERCLA and state analog liability scheme is meant to target the parties who 
profit from the hazardous substances.  In the refiner/dealer case, the PLP is 
one of the dirtiest, as well as the wealthiest, industry in the history of the 
entity, at any facility . . . .”  While an argument can be advanced that Alaska’s 
language merely corrects a typo in CERCLA’s language, the court in Berg v. 
Popham found the different language suggests legislative intention to apply 
arranger liability more broadly under Alaska’s scheme than under CERCLA’s. 
Supra note 97. 
127. Id., supra note 97.
128. Id.
129. Parks Hiway Enters., LLC v. CEM Leasing, Inc., 995 P.2d 657, 660-
61 (Alaska 2000).  The Parks Hiway plaintiff does not appear to have argued 
arranger liability, and even though it invoked the common law principle of 
abnormally dangerous activity in its effort to find a tort cause of action, it 
did not argue the principal/contractor theory of vicarious liability.  As noted 
in the text, the principal/contractor relationship is much clearer between a 
refiner and a branded dealer, than a jobber and an independent dealer. 
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world.  There is every good reason for a court in Washington or Alaska to 
find a refiner liable for the contaminated station, even if the refiner’s only 
connection to the site was supplying product.   
The particular value of the arranger theory is to bring a significant PLP 
into the liability net in cases where an easy hook, like ownership, does not 
exist.  But the theory can also be employed to bring a second cause of action 
(owner and arranger liability) against refiners who both owned and supplied 
the contaminated station, as in the lessee-dealer distribution model.   
Although the so-called “Gore factors” may allow a plaintiff to argue 
equitable allocation based on benefits reaped by the owner-refiner, as 
compared to other PLPs, arranger liability very directly demonstrates why 
the owner-refiner is more responsible than, say, the landlord it leased the 
site from.130  Both are “owners” within the contemplation of the statutory 
scheme.  But the refiner is also an arranger. 131  Indeed, the only reason the 
refiner took ownership of the site in the first place, was so it could sell its 
gasoline there.  The owner-refiner may have profited from the lessee-dealer’s 
rent, who knows if and how much, but it was the profit to be made from 
supplying the station (refiner as arranger) that the refiner was after.   
It is to be hoped that post-LUST gas stations won’t experience the 
significant problems that arose with the USTs in service in the last century. 
And some day, presumably, all the pre-LUST stations will be cleaned up. 
Until that day, in the States of Washington and Alaska, there is a viable 
liability theory on which refiners who otherwise escape liability entirely, and 
owner-refiners who otherwise point equitable allocation fingers, can be held 
accountable for “the environmental externalities associated with” their 
profitable but hazardous product.  
130. Named for then Vice-President Al Gore, who proposed that six
factors be incorporated into CERCLA for guidance as to when liability 
should be joint and several and when by contribution.  Though never 
enacted, the factors are often used to determine equitable allocation of 
liability shares.  See Envtl. Transp. Syss., Inc., v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503 
(7th Circ.1992). 
131. In both FMC and Cadillac, the PLPs were already liable as owners
and their liability shares were increased by the court finding them also liable 
as operators and arrangers.  See FMC Corp. v. U.S., 786 F.Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 
1992); see also Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 299 F.3d 1019 
(9th Cir. 2002).   
